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ABSTRACT 
 
Overlap and gaps in assistance within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s 
Cluster Approach for humanitarian aid is a major issue plaguing the international 
community and its response to emergencies. The inefficiencies within the cooperative 
effort of involved agencies leads to prolonged suffering and death within the countries in 
need of humanitarian aid.  With these dire consequences riding on the ability of this 
mobilization system to function effective, it is imperative that steps be taken to ensure 
competent humanitarian response. There is no clearly outlined path to assist those 
experiencing humanitarian crisis, but there is a particular objective in mind. This goal, to 
aid countries until the critical point at which they can appropriately help themselves, 
warrants an efficient and effective response from those unaffected by the crisis that is in 
both parties best interest.  The following proposes that the Cluster Approach focus its 
efforts on mitigation and preparedness.  Shifting to a system that concentrates on 
preventing humanitarian crisis in all regions would help the Cluster Approach to 
accomplish its intended goals of overall effectiveness, predictable leadership, enhanced 
partnership, and increased accountability. Improvements in these areas would ensure that 
fewer individuals would face the consequences of a humanitarian crisis and that those 
who do would receive competent assistance quickly.
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INTRODUCTION 
Gaps and overlap in humanitarian aid are a persistent issue that the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) sought to remedy by creating and implementing the Cluster 
Approach.  This method employs the use of integrated groups of nongovernmental 
organizations, local governments, and United Nations’ agencies.  These cooperative units 
focus on eleven different areas of humanitarian concern.  A mutual effort to address the 
issues individuals in affected areas experience after emergencies was intended to offer a 
more complete response. In 2007, two years after the method was employed, an effort to 
evaluate the success of the Cluster Approach in filling gaps in aid distribution and 
providing a smoother method of aid mobilization. The in-depth analysis of the 
collaborative system revealed that many of the benefits that United Nations and the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee hoped to gain by implementing the Cluster Approach had 
yet to be achieved. Though the system was still in its infant stage of development at the 
time of evaluation, the failures still raises major concerns about its long-term success. It 
is prudent to consider other viable alternatives to the Cluster Approach that could be an 
effective solution to the lack of efficiency experienced in aid mobilization and 
distribution. Just as important to consider is what is required ethically of the United 
Nations aggregate and the various agencies that stem from it. This analysis seeks to 
answer a very particular question. How can the United Nations, in conjunction with the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), reconstruct the Cluster Approach in order to
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uphold their moral responsibility to aid others and provide efficient and effective 
humanitarian assistance to those who are experiencing a state of emergency?  Identifying 
a solution to this question involves defining individual moral responsibility to provide aid 
and detecting the major inefficiencies within the cluster system. After extensive research, 
I propose that a cooperative system focused on mitigation and preparedness would be the 
most efficient and morally responsible route for the Cluster Approach to employ.  
The following analysis and proposal utilizes a systematic review as its research 
method. It relies on both qualitative and quantitative data in order to evaluate the 
perceived and actual success of the Cluster Approach. Chapter 1 offers a brief review of 
the history of United Nation’s humanitarian aid and their mission.  In addition, it provides 
an analysis of select pieces of philosophical literature and seeks to identify the ethical 
responsibilities of individual agents to provide aid to those in need in an attempt to 
connect that responsibility to the United Nations aggregate.  Chapter 2 provides context 
for the Cluster Approach and background on why it was initially introduced. Chapter 3 
describes in explicit detail how the Cluster Approach operates and identifies deficits in 
the current system specifically identifying gaps and overlap in humanitarian assistance 
since cluster infrastructure was implemented.  Chapter 4 introduces a new proposal 
calling for a shift in the focus of the Cluster Approach toward mitigation and 
preparedness in order to remedy kinks in the current system and ensure that the United 
Nations, government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations are fulfilling their 
moral responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance.  
The data analyzed was gathered from numerous published sources including 
philosophical publications, official United Nations’ documents, reports from Inter-
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Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and third party analyses.  Synthesis of the 
information gathered revealed there was little discussion of the connection between 
international humanitarian assistance policy and an agent’s moral responsibility.  The 
research presented seeks to bridge the gap between philosophical theory and pragmatic 
policy solutions to an important global issue. Ultimately, it seeks to fulfill both social and 
moral obligations to the problems facing the international community.    
	 4 
CHAPTER 1:  A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN AID:  
WHAT IS REQUIRED OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE CLUSTER APPROACH 
 The question of aid in times of crisis is a long-term predicament that many 
generations of global society have faced. This question is particularly difficult to answer 
because of the multiple facets of which it consists and its entertainment of the notion of 
ethical duty. Is there a responsibility to help other societies in times of crisis? If so, to 
whom does this responsibility belong? And finally, what kind of obligations make up this 
responsibility of aid in crisis? Amartya Sen and John Rawls offer insight on this issue of 
aid: what should be done and who should do it. In what follows, I will offer analyses of 
both Sen and Rawls position on crisis and aid. Then, I will connect the two arguments 
and conclude that well-ordered states have a responsibility to aid those in crisis and an 
obligation to ensure equity to prevent further crisis. 
 Amartya Sen addresses crises, aid, and prevention; specifically famine related 
crisis; in chapter seven, Famines and Other Crises, of his well renown book Development 
as Freedom. He attempts to shift the argument about famine from one that focuses solely 
on the amount of food in a nation to one that is based on societal inequities. Sen claims 
that famine in the modern world is not just caused by an imbalance between food and 
population, but it is also caused by the lack of freedom that people must access and 
possess an adequate amount of food or means to produce food.  His argument 
concentrates on the lost economic and substantive power, referred to as entitlements, 
within societies that are experiencing famine. He finds his solution in the 
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reapportionment of this power to the poor and affected.  
 To begin his argument, Sen describes the distribution, or allocation, of food 
within a society. Sen rationalizes his belief claiming, 
“Food is not distributed in the economy through charity or some system of 
automatic sharing. The ability to acquire food has to be earned. What we must 
concentrate on is not the total food supply in the economy but the “entitlement” 
that each person enjoys: the commodities over which she can establish her 
ownership and command. People suffer from hunger when they cannot establish 
their own entitlement over an adequate amount of food”.1 
These entitlements, and lack thereof, have less to do with the quantity of food in a 
particular society and more to do with the social and political arrangements that occur 
there. A person’s entitlements depend on endowment, production possibilities, and 
exchange conditions.2  If any of these factors are disrupted or altered, it can affect their 
ability to acquire resources, with this case in particular, food. 
 According to Sen, entitlement failures, not lack of available resources, is the 
major cause of famines.  He explains, 
“Since famines are associated with the loss of entitlements of one or more 
occupational groups in particular regions, the resulting starvation can be 
prevented by systemically re-creating a minimum level of incomes and 
entitlements for those who are hit by economic changes”. 3 
																																																								1	Sen, Amartya. "Chapter 7: Famines and Other Crises." Development as Freedom. 
New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. 160-203. Print. Page 137. 
2 Ibid.162-163. 
3 Sen, Amartya. "Chapter 7: Famines and Other Crises." Development as Freedom. 
New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. 160-203. Print. Page 168. 
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The solution to ending and preventing famines is found in programs and employment 
opportunities that simulate the base level of entitlement for those individuals and groups 
that lost theirs. This burden falls on the government and policymakers of a society to 
ensure that the disenfranchised individuals are guaranteed a substantive amount of 
entitlements in order to avoid or end famine and the resulting starvation. Sen explains 
that these programs give affected individuals, “…the ability to compete for food in the 
market, making the available supply more equally shared.”4  In addition, these programs 
allow “…potential famine victims to be treated as active agents, rather than as passive 
recipients of governmental handouts.”5  Sen explains that the integration of governmental 
and nongovernmental institutions in the creation of employment, income, and ultimately 
opportunity is extremely important in the abolition of famine and the expansion of the 
economy in general that can help increase and protect entitlements to prevent famine. 
 The solutions mentioned by Sen can only remedy or prevent famines when the 
government or ruling body is sovereign and democratic. Sen states, 
The causal connection between democracy and the nonoccurrence of famines is 
not hard to seek. Famines kill millions of people in different countries in the 
world, but they don’t kill the rulers. The kings and the presidents, the bureaucrats 
and the bosses, the military leaders and the commanders never are famine victims. 
And if there are no elections, no opposition parties, no scope for uncensored 
																																																								
4 Ibid.177. 
5 Ibid.178. 	
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public criticism, then those in authority don’t have to suffer the political 
consequences of their failure to prevent famines.6 
Only a government that is accountable to its constituents can end starvation from famine 
and protect their society from future threat.  For a state to be fully accountable to its 
constituency it must take every step to prevent major devastating events from occurring 
and helping to better prepare for the future in case such event inevitably ensues.  This 
accountability should manifest itself as mitigation and preparedness policies and 
emergency training efforts. Democracy insists that leaders take on the burden of crisis 
just as its people do. In this case, there is no distinction or gap between us and them.7  
This creates a personal stake and urgency in its duty to prevent famine, which as 
previously stated, are easily prevented.  With this in mind, Sen claims, “…the absence of 
democracy is in itself an inequality—in this case of political rights and powers. But more 
than that, famines and other crises thrive on the basis of severe and sometimes suddenly 
increased inequality.”8  Absence of democracy, in Sen’s perspective, is a considerable 
inequality and can lead to many failures in entitlements that cause and famine. 
 In Part III, Non ideal Theory, of John Rawls’ work The Law of Peoples, he 
acknowledges the importance of Amartya Sen’s analysis of famines.  Rawls states, 
…in his empirical study of four well-known historical cases, he found that food 
decline need not be the main cause of famine, or even a minor cause. The main 
problem was the failure of respective governments to distribute (and supplement) 
																																																								6	Sen, Amartya. "Chapter 7: Famines and Other Crises." Development as Freedom. 
New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. 160-203. Print. Page 180. 
7 Ibid.175. 
8 Ibid.187. 
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what food there was…[famines] are attributed to faults within the political and 
social structure, and its failure to institute policies to remedy the effects of 
shortfalls…9 
Rawls names this type of society, one “burdened by unfavorable conditions”, as a 
burdened society.10 He attempts to evaluate the relationship between the peoples of well-
ordered societies and the peoples of burdened societies, particularly in the case where 
burdened societies are faced with crisis.  
 Rawls claims that peoples of well-ordered societies have a particular obligation to 
aid those in burdened, non-liberal societies when they experience emergency situations 
and crisis. This duty is limited and is not synonymous with the duty that compatriots have 
to each other. Rawls explains that, “…there is no recipe, certainly no easy recipe, for 
well-ordered peoples to help a burdened society to change its political and social 
culture."11  Though he explains that there is no easy process to providing aid, Rawls also 
contends that, 
…the aim is to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs 
reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of 
well-ordered Peoples. This defines the “target of assistance.12 
The goal of this assistance is to put societies in crisis in a position where their problems 
are manageable enough so they can become well-ordered and hopefully enter willingly 
into the society of well-ordered peoples. Although Rawls sees no duty for assistance past 
this point, the end goal is to have all societies enter into the society of well-ordered 																																																								
9 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Havard UP, 1999. Print. Page 109. 
10 Ibid. 106. 
11 Ibid. 108. 
12 Ibid. 111. 
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peoples.  Employing Rawls’ reasoning, it would be more efficient to help those societies 
implement mitigation policies and preparedness techniques in preparation for crisis than 
it would be to provide limited amounts of aid after each crisis occurs. Focusing on 
formulating a system for these burdened societies to mobilize in order to avoid 
destructive effects of crises, satisfies the moral obligation that Rawls’ describes while 
also helping these societies to transition into a well-ordered condition.  
 In addition to highlighting the existence of a duty to aid, Rawls also provides 
insight into what people of well-ordered societies are responsible for in their aiding of 
non-liberal societies facing crisis. He argues,  
…merely dispensing funds will not suffice to rectify basic political and social 
injustices (though money is often essential). But an emphasis on human rights 
may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of the rulers who have 
been callous about the well-being of their own people.13 
Simply throwing money at a non-liberal society in an emergency or crisis will not 
effectively or efficiently aid them, and it is not what Rawls suggests being done. What 
Rawls does recommend is that peoples of well-ordered societies work to adequately and 
fairly distribute power and eliminate gross injustices in non-liberal societies.  This 
includes the development of proper mitigation strategies to prevent more problems from 
arising in the wake of avoidable crises.  He contends, 
																																																								13	Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Havard UP, 1999. Print. Page 108-109. 
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“…there is no society anywhere in the world that—except for marginal cases—
with resources so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally 
organized and governed, become well ordered.”14 
With this notion in mind, Rawls claims that liberal, well-ordered societies have a 
responsibility to aid other non-liberal, burdened societies by restructuring their existing 
institution, correcting injustices, and allowing the societies themselves to hopefully 
become liberal and well-ordered on their own.  This includes creating and perfecting 
mitigation efforts such as governmental policies and preparedness training within a 
society. 
 Rawls and Sen both offer significant insight into the responsibility of an 
established liberal society to aid other societies in times of crisis. If a liberal society is 
facing crisis, they should try integrating governmental and nongovernmental components 
to ensure the entitlements of their constituents and ultimately end the crisis. If a non-
liberal, burdened society is experiencing a crisis, well-ordered, liberal societies have a 
limited duty to assist these countries by clearing their problems enough so they 
themselves can reorganize and become liberal societies and members of the society of 
well-ordered peoples.  Simply explained, liberal societies have a fundamental 
responsibility to aid non-liberal, burdened societies experiencing crisis to a point at which 
those countries can assist themselves.  This assistance, though it is not explicitly defined, 
can be specified in a myriad of different ways. 
 Though there is no explicitly outlined proper way to assist a society experiencing 
a crisis, there is a specific goal in mind. This goal, to aid countries until the pivotal point 																																																								
14 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Havard UP, 1999. Print. Page 108. 	
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in time at which they can suitably help themselves, warrants an efficient and effective 
response from the liberal, well-ordered society providing aid that is in both parties best 
interest. In order to address the prescribed responsibilities outlined by Sen and Rawls, the 
best of course of action for liberal, well-ordered societies is to aid in the development of 
mitigation strategies for countries requiring aid. The age-old adage, “Give a man to fish, 
and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime,” holds 
true in analyzing this predicament.  Providing aid in response to a crisis by simply 
handing out needed resources or repairing infrastructure will surely remedy the situation 
for the time being but it lacks the ability to equip the non-liberal, burdened society with 
the tools to help themselves for the time being, and undoubtedly, for the future.  Placing a 
metaphorical bandage on a crisis does not fulfill the responsibility of liberal, well-ordered 
societies to provide aid until the country in crisis is self-sufficient.  Doing this only 
perpetuates the problem and ensures that those societies will be in need of assistance in 
the future. By giving these societies that are experiencing crises the tools to avoid and 
prepare for emergencies, liberal, well-ordered societies accomplish the goal of sustaining 
burdened societies until they are equipped to handle the crisis without assistance.  This 
perspective moves the obligation from a place of reaction and response to a position of 
forethought and planning.   
 The benefits of this interpretation of the ethical obligation of liberal, well-ordered 
societies to provide aid to burdened societies experiencing crisis are two-fold.  Providing 
assistance during the creation and implementation of mitigation policy reduces the 
likelihood that the societies will require aid in the future because they have the tools in 
place to either handle the crisis on their own or avoid a crisis altogether.  This lessens the 
	 12 
burden of moral responsibility on liberal, well-ordered societies, and it grants the 
burdened society the sovereignty to manage their own emergency situations, which is an 
empowering thing for the group as a whole.  Empowering these burdened societies could 
lead to a stronger collective society of well-ordered people.
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CHAPTER 2:  RATIONALE FOR HUMANITARIAN AID REFORM AND CONTEXT 
FOR THE CLUSTER APPROACH 
Efficiency and effectiveness are common goals of almost all organizations 
regardless of their specific sector or personal mission. This is especially true for 
establishments that provide a service to individuals and even more so for those working 
with emergency response and humanitarian aid. Overlap and gaps in assistance within an 
emergency response group are not only major inefficiencies in the organization. Left 
unresolved, these problems could translate into an increase in suffering and death in the 
areas receiving the aid. The United Nations, an intergovernmental organization devoted 
to global cooperation, faced major inefficiency issues with its Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  In response to the disorganization, the United Nations 
implemented a new systematic method to aid that sought to reduce the amount of overlap 
and gaps in assistance and promoted a multifaceted approach to relieve and solve 
emergency situations. Named for its multidimensional and cooperative structure, this new 
method is referred to as the Cluster Approach. 
 In the mid 2000s, the modern world was experiencing an epidemic of emergency 
situations characterized by its vast and devastating effects. Darfur, the western region of 
the African country of Sudan, was facing a deficit of basic resources and major conflict 
over land and these resources between ethnic groups. Public perception of the United
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 Nations response to the emergency situation deemed it to be completely insufficient.15  
Poor public opinion on the emergency response in Darfur prompted the United Nations 
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG) and Emergency Relief 
Coordinator (ERC) in conjunction with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to 
commence the Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis 
in August of 2004.16  The intent of this assessment was to identify areas in emergency 
response that needed improvement within Darfur and on a broader level that could apply 
to future humanitarian assistance efforts.17 
 Based predominantly on learning, the evaluation of the United Nations 
humanitarian response in Darfur also enlisted the assistance of the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Cooperative for Assistance and 
Relief Everywhere (CARE).18  The assessment was conducted in real-time over a series 
of three visits to Sudan: September 2004, January/February 2005, and June/July 2005 
through a “…first hand observation, surveys, key stakeholder interviews, focus groups, 
background documents, participatory workshops…and other lessons learned exercises”.19  
The intent of this approach was to allow department officials to observe and evaluate the 
response to the humanitarian crisis as it occurred and to develop and implement changes 
																																																								
15 Broughton, Bernard et al. Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation Of The Humanitarian 
Response To The Darfur Crisis. 1st ed. 2006. Web. 12 Mar. 2016. 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/RTE_DARFUR_Final_Report_14_Mar.pdf  
Page 1. 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid. 
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to the current system of aid in real-time for a more immediate solution.20 Based on the 
approach, the majority of the information for the evaluation was gathered by frontline 
components including United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and some beneficiaries.21 
 Based on the observations and information the study collected, the United Nations 
concluded that the humanitarian response to the crisis in Darfur was “…delayed and 
inadequate, primarily due to the inability of agencies to mobilize capacity and 
resources”.22  Organizations and agencies cannot be forced to operate successfully under 
a directive approach.23  During this time, humanitarian response was structured in a 
standard way in which tasks are allotted to individuals from the top of the hierarchy to the 
bottom without group-based input or further questioning. This superior to subordinate, 
chain of command type mobilization was not efficient or successful in providing 
complete assistance to those experiencing crisis.  Orders from one individual lack 
comprehension of the entirety of the situation and leave room for significant gaps in the 
distribution of aid. Instead, organizations must compromise and come up with cohesive 																																																								
20 Broughton, Bernard et al. Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation Of The Humanitarian 
Response To The Darfur Crisis. 1st ed. 2006. Web. 12 Mar. 2016. 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/RTE_DARFUR_Final_Report_14_Mar.pdf  
Page 2. 
21 Broughton, Bernard et al. Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation Of The Humanitarian 
Response To The Darfur Crisis. 1st ed. 2006. Web. 12 Mar. 2016. 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/RTE_DARFUR_Final_Report_14_Mar.pdf  
Page 2. 
22 Humphries, Vanessa. "Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Common Challenges 
and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach." The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance. April 30, 2013. Accessed September 28, 2015. 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976. Page 2. 
23 Humphries, Vanessa. "Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Common Challenges 
and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach." The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance. April 30, 2013. Accessed September 28, 2015. 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976. Page 2. 
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approach to adequately aid those in emergency situations.24  In addition, the evaluation 
found that there were “…gaps in coordination, information sharing, interagency 
coordination, strategic leadership, and cross-sectorial issues such as livelihoods, gender, 
and protection”.25   The conclusions of this evaluation increased the necessity for reform 
within the emergency response and humanitarian aid systems.  
 The evaluation of humanitarian aid in Darfur and the heightened awareness of 
disasters following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 led the United Nations Emergency 
Relief Coordinator (ERC) to commission the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) to 
find a way “… to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of humanitarian response to 
emergencies”.26  The Humanitarian Response Review evaluated the capacities of United 
Nations, non-governmental agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and other 
humanitarian agents and provided ways to alleviate inefficiencies in response.27  The 
United Nations created and applied a series of reforms in 2005 based on this study.  
Categorized into four pillars, the reforms sought to  
…improve humanitarian leadership (through Humanitarian Coordinators system); 
[implement] better coordination of humanitarian action (through the Cluster 
Approach); promote faster, more predictable and equitable funding (through 
improved humanitarian financing, such as the Central Emergency Response fund 
(CERF)); and [facilitate] more effective partnerships among all humanitarian 
																																																								
24 Humphries, Vanessa. "Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Common Challenges 
and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach." The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance. April 30, 2013. Accessed September 28, 2015. 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976. Page 2. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 3. 
27 Ibid. 
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actors (through the Principles of Partnership implemented in 2007.28 
 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) sought to create a more 
synchronized humanitarian aid response in December of 2005 when they established The 
Cluster Approach.  Aligned with the second pillar of reform designed by the United 
Nations, the Cluster Approach was created “…to address gaps in humanitarian response 
and to improve the predictability, accountability, and effectiveness of relief efforts 
through a more coordinated humanitarian relief response.”29  It was created to remedy the 
detrimental aspects of the current humanitarian aid in emergency situations within the 
United Nations and provide more useful aid for individuals and countries experiencing 
major crises across the world. 
																																																								
28 Humphries, Vanessa. "Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Common Challenges 
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CHAPTER 3:  A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE 
CLUSTER APPROACH 
Established as a means to fix the myriad of problems created by an inefficient and 
futile system, the Cluster Approach was considered a promising reform for emergency 
aid mobilization. This method sought to bring about “…predictability, responsibility, 
accountability and partnership in all areas of humanitarian action” within the scope of the 
United Nations and those organizations with which they operate.45 With the adoption of 
this new type of management guiding humanitarian relief, the focus of preparation for aid 
shifted to a new direction. “…[A] group of organizations coalescing around a common 
area of work…” paired with “…a spirit of inclusivity and partnership where all 
stakeholders are transparently and mutually accountable for what they do” was the goal 
of the Cluster Approach at its creation.46  The success of the approach is based almost 
exclusively on the complete participation of the parties involved.47  Like many collective 
efforts, the investment of the agencies within these specific groups is vitally important in 
ensuring that all issues related to an emergency situation are addressed, that no affected 
group is excluded, and that overlapping response does not
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 occur.  “The Cluster Approach aims to strengthen system-wide preparedness, 
make sure that critical materials and expertise are immediately available, and focus 
technical capacity.”48 This system seeks to “…identif[y] ways to work together for better 
collective results.”49 It was generated as an efficient response to “large non-refugee 
complex humanitarian crises, in which needs extend beyond any one agency's mandate 
and where the needs are of sufficient scale and complexity.”50 Using this process allows 
for several improvements in the humanitarian aid provided by the United Nations. The 
Cluster approach “increases transparency and accountability…in resource allocation, 
establish[es] co-leadership, and focus on operational performance,” through developed 
mechanisms unique to the process.51 In addition, this method of humanitarian aid 
management “enhances predictability” through less ambiguous “sector and thematic 
responsibilities.”52  The Cluster Approach more fully engages “national and local 
authorities.”53  Having a single person to call within the international humanitarian 
architecture speeds up the resolution of issues, and allows greater access for 
[nongovernmental organizations] (NGOs) to government and [United Nations] UN 
decision-makers.54  The inclusive nature of the approach allows for the involvement of 
																																																								
48 UNHCR Emergency Handbook: Cluster Approach (IASC)." UNHCR Emergency 
Handbook. Accessed May 17, 2016. https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/61190/cluster-
approach-iasc. Page 3. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
		 20 
“affected communities” in the aid process.55  It “…requires humanitarian actors to 
consult and engage with the populations they assist…[and] affected communities help to 
determine the best responses to the problems they face.”56  Using a fortified system of 
collective effort toward a common ultimate goal, the Cluster Approach stimulates more 
“effective advocacy.”57 When clusters, singly or collectively, speak with one voice on 
issues of common concern, and with affected groups who are not normally heard, 
advocacy has more weight.58 Finally, “formal processes of coordination within and 
between cluster,” including “…joint strategic and operational planning…enhance 
efficiency and improve effectiveness.”59 These enhancements have led to a more 
comprehensive and successful relief response to non-refugee emergencies throughout the 
world.  
The Cluster Approach is a multifaceted system that emphasizes a hierarchical structure 
with leadership at each level. Organizing the system in such a way ensures accountability 
from the smallest of tasks to the largest of responsibilities. “At the global level, the aim of 
the cluster approach is to strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to 
respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring that there is predictable leadership and 
accountability in all the main sectors or areas of humanitarian response.”60   The creation 
of clusters at a global level helps to fill gaps in assistance and “…enhance technical 																																																								
55 UNHCR Emergency Handbook: Cluster Approach (IASC)." UNHCR Emergency 
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capacity and better ensure the immediate availability of critical material and expertise.”61  
At a country level, “…It is about achieving more strategic responses and better 
prioritization of available resources by clarifying the division of labour among 
organizations, better defining the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian organizations 
within the sectors, and providing the Humanitarian Coordinator with both a first point of 
call and a provider of last resort in all the key sectors or areas of activity.”62 Though 
sectors at this level have existed for quite some time, “…it was usually the case that only 
a limited number of sectors had clearly designated lead agencies accountable to the 
Humanitarian Coordinator.”63  “The cluster approach aims to rectify this by ensuring that 
within the international humanitarian response, there is a clear system of leadership and 
accountability for all the key sectors or areas of humanitarian activity.”64  The 
implementation of the cluster system was not meant to overhaul the previous methods 
that the United Nations and global society used. The Cluster Approach aims to strengthen 
the old system of assistance and revitalize the efforts to create a more efficient and 
effective method of providing humanitarian aid in times of crisis.65 As a whole, the 
structures of the cluster system and the policies implemented by it have raised “…the 
standards in humanitarian response.”66 The Cluster Approach does this by specifically 
outlining accountability, definitively dividing emergency relief into separate facets, and 
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providing contacts for these various components associated with humanitarian aid in 
times of crises.67 
In order to achieve the most effective outcome, the Cluster Approach is structured 
in a specific way that complements the problems that global society faces in the wake of 
an emergency.  This particular structure translates into eleven separate but interdependent 
clusters that cover the spectrum of issues often associated with crisis. “In practice, 
clusters were introduced for nine areas of response and two service areas.”68  “The 
service clusters differ from the response clusters in that they provide services to other 
humanitarian organizations, rather than the affected population, have a stronger focus on 
global preparedness activities and, where necessary, act as the main service provider, 
rather than as provider of last resort.”69 These clusters are appropriately named after the 
sectors of humanitarian aid that they encompass:  logistics; nutrition; emergency shelter; 
camp management and cooperation; health; protection; food security, emergency 
telecommunication; early recovery; education; and sanitation, water, and hygiene.70  
“Clusters provide a clear point of contact and are accountable for adequate and 
appropriate humanitarian assistance.”71 The following figure provides a visual 
representation of the different clusters and the United Nations’ offices to which they 
correspond. 																																																								
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Figure 1:  Designation of the Clusters of the United Nations Cluster Approach 
72 
In addition to these eleven main clusters, there are several “cross-cutting issues” or “sub-
clusters” that “…enjoy a similar status to independent clusters.”73  These crosscutting 
issues include age, environment, gender, and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDs).74  They are referred to as cross-cutting 
issues because of their unique ability to involve several clusters at once. The following 
chart provides an organized visual of how clusters and crosscutting issues are divided and 
which agencies lead each designated cluster. 
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Figure 2: Clusters and Lead Agencies at the Global Level 
75 
Structure is an integral part of the Cluster Approach and its realization. In order 
for the system to completely accomplish its goals, it must be organizationally stable on 
both small and large-scale levels.  The Cluster Approach and those who lead the 
relatively small-scale efforts are components of a much larger hierarchy of international 
aid and response. The “coordination architecture of the cluster approach” is vitally 
important for its continued efficient and effective operation.76  Without cooperation from 
the agencies involved, the concentrated effort to offer strategic, effective aid to regions 																																																								
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and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach." The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance. April 30, 2013. Accessed September 28, 2015. 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976. Page 3. 
76 "UNHCR Emergency Handbook: Cluster Approach (IASC)." UNHCR Emergency 
Handbook. Accessed May 17, 2016. https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/61190/cluster-
approach-iasc. Page 5. 
		 25 
experiencing emergency situations will not work.  At the most senior level is the United 
Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC).77  The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) “…is responsible for overseeing all 
complex emergencies that require UN humanitarian assistance.”78  In essence, the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the executive body to which all United Nations 
humanitarian assistance is accountable.  “In countries affected by disasters or conflict, the 
ERC may appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator [(HC)].”79  The Under Secretary for 
Humanitarian Affairs is the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).80  Lead by the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
“…is a unique inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-
making.”81 The United Nations General Assembly established the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) in June of 1992 in order to improve inter-agency coordination and 
effectiveness in response to humanitarian crisis.82  It is composed of both “…United 
Nations and non-United Nations humanitarian partners…” and is responsible for 
“…develop[ing] humanitarian policies, demarcates responsibilities across the various 
dimensions of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and 
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advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles.”83  Due to the complex 
nature of humanitarian crises and the sheer number of agencies that could be involved in 
response, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is exceptionally large and 
intricate in organization. The following chart outlines the structure of the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) and the myriad of agencies that operate under its umbrella.  
Figure 3:  The Structure of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
84  
Accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the Humanitarian 
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Coordinator (HC) in a country where an emergency has occurred “…is responsible for 
assessing whether an international response is warranted and, if it is, for ensuring it is 
well organized.”85  In much simpler terms, the Humanitarian Coordinator is a regional 
director of emergency response.  The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) leads a 
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), “…a strategic and operational decision making and 
oversight forum,” composed of  “…representatives from the United Nations (UN), 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)…” and a representative from the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.86   The 
Humanitarian Country Team “…is responsible for agreeing on strategic issues related to 
humanitarian action.”87 This inter-agency initiative are solely concerned with the most 
efficient humanitarian response for their particular region. Cluster Lead Agencies (CLAs) 
are accountable to the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Humanitarian Country 
Team (HCT).88 The head of a Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) “…ensures that coordination 
mechanisms are established and properly supported, act as first point of call for the 
government and [Humanitarian Coordinator] (HC), [and] are the provider of last resort in 
their respective cluster.”89 Under the Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) is a Cluster 
Coordinator. A Cluster Coordinator is “…responsible for ensuring that cluster-specific 
concerns, and challenges that cannot be solved within a cluster, are raised and properly 
discussed by the [Humanitarian Country Team] (HCT), and that strategic decisions are 
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shared and implemented at operational level.”90  This individual or group “…acts as an 
‘honest broker’ independent of their parent agency affiliation.”91   They set goals and 
make decisions based upon the best interest of the program for humanitarian aid 
mobilization. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
“…works closely with global cluster lead agencies and NGOs to develop policies, 
coordinate inter-cluster issues, disseminate operational guidance, and organize field 
support.”92 On a local level, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) supports the decisions of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the 
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and “…facilitates inter-cluster coordination.”93  “It 
also helps coordination between clusters at all phases of the response, including needs 
assessment, joint planning, and monitoring and evaluation.”94  The following figure 
offers a visual presentation of the architecture and hierarchy of the United Nation’s 
cluster approach. 
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Figure 4:  Coordination Architecture in the Cluster Approach 
95 
For each emergency or disaster, a group or cluster is generated. This cluster 
includes individuals from a myriad of groups including but not limited to several United 
Nations departments, nongovernmental organizations, and various government agencies. 
“Organizations that join clusters undertake to adhere to humanitarian principles and the 
principles of partnership, participate in actions that specifically improve accountability to 
affected populations, engage consistently in the cluster's collective work, and make 
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capacity available for this, make the best use of resources, and share information on 
organizational resources, take on leadership responsibilities as needed and as capacity 
and mandates allow, and help to develop and disseminate advocacy and messaging for 
relevant audiences.”96  
Evaluations of the Implementation of the Cluster Approach 
 Since the implementation of the cluster system, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
(OCHA) of the United Nations (UN) have evaluated its progress on two separate 
occasions. The first evaluation, conducted by the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), took place in 2007, the third year of the system’s 
implementation.97  Mixed methods including interviews, document review, field visits, 
and surveys were used to fully evaluate the impact of the Cluster Approach and identify 
the areas of weakness.98  This primary evaluation found that most survey respondents and 
interviewees believed that the Cluster Approach had filled some of the gaps in 
humanitarian aid experienced before it was implemented.99  Many believed the general 
effectiveness of humanitarian aid utilizing the Cluster Approach was successful, but it 
lacks efficiency in the areas of partnership enhancement, leadership quality, and 
accountability at all levels. Though many of these gaps have been filled, the evaluation 
reveals that the consensus is that these results were not realized immediately, at the first 
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implementation of the Cluster Approach in 2005.100  These issues in implementations are 
expected in the early stages of implementation of such a large systemic approach that has 
far reaching effects.  As the Cluster Approach continues to be used to mobilize 
humanitarian relief for those experiencing crisis, policy kinks and remaining gaps and 
overlaps in assistance will be addressed as with any extensive program. United Nations 
policy reformers need to identify those issues that impede proper employment of the 
mobilization system to ensure the benefits are realized. 
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 CHAPTER 4:  FOCUSED MITIGATION AND PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS WITHIN 
CLUSTERS AS AN ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN THE CLUSTER APPROACH AS 
A COLLECTIVE BODY 
 Since evaluation started, the Cluster Approach’s reform process has been focused 
on more efficient and effective mobilization and action after a humanitarian crisis, 
contained or widespread.   United Nations’ policymakers and assessors concentrated on 
four distinct pillars of emphasis to measure the progress of and identify the gaps and 
shortcomings within this new systematic approach.  These four intended goals of the 
Cluster Approach include: improving effectiveness in overall humanitarian response, 
creating predictable leadership, enhancing partnership between different humanitarian 
actors, and increasing the accountability of relief efforts.115 With these four goals in 
mind, reformers synthesized the effects of the implementation of the Cluster Approach 
and gauged its overall success.  In doing so, major issues were highlighted and the 
opportunity for policy reform arose. Future success of the Cluster Approach will be 
determined by the changes made to the structure and concentration of the system.  In 
what follows, I will propose the idea that emphasis on formal mitigation efforts within 
each of the nine clusters will ultimately lead to a more efficient system capable of 
achieving its goals. “Mitigation involves deciding what to do where a risk to the health, 
safety, and welfare of society has been determined to exist and then implementing a risk																																																								115	Humphries, V. (2013, April 30). Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Common 
Challenges and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach. Retrieved September 28, 
2015, from http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976.  
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reduction program.”116 In other words, “…mitigation is sustained action to reduce or 
eliminate risk to people and property from hazards and their effects”.117 Within the 
context of humanitarian crisis, mitigation would involve identifying vulnerabilities within 
a particular area and making adjustments after an emergency to ensure that future crises 
are less likely to occur and if they do occur that they are quickly and efficiently handled 
with ease. These adjustments could include hazard identification and mapping, design 
and construction applications such as code sensitivity and retrofit ordinances, land-use 
planning including proper zoning rules and prohibition of development in high risk 
zones, financial incentives for preparedness, and structural controls.118 On the ground 
level, mitigation would require recognition of potential emergency situations and 
working to prevent or more adequately respond to them. Internationally, humanitarian 
crises are largely social and political.119 This being said, mitigation and preparedness 
efforts would help individual countries, nongovernmental organizations, and the United 
Nations bypass obstacles that would impede relief, recovery, and reconstruction. In some 
instances, mitigation might even eliminate the presence of certain emergencies.   
Easing the burden of a humanitarian crisis is a mutual goal of all agencies 
involved in the Cluster Approach mobilized through the United Nations. In order to 
properly respond and ultimately eradicate the humanitarian issues experienced by the 
international community, executives within the cluster system must look to those at the 
center of struggle. Grassroots level personnel as well as local governmental entities and 
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individual victims hold the answer to a successful recovery. Without proper 
understanding of the problems local people are experiencing, response and recovery are 
simply not possible. Inability to respond to the problem when it occurs certainly makes 
the possibility of mitigation virtually impossible. This kind of victim focused efforts 
utilized by the cluster system would allow complex bureaucracy to more completely 
comprehend the local struggles of the common individual. Better understanding and 
leadership from the grassroots level will help in the development and enactment of 
successful mitigation programs because they would adequately address the real issues 
being experienced and local victims would be invested in the process of preparedness. In 
terms of cluster engagement, this grassroots level would include personnel from local 
governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies, and 
affected individuals. 
In 2006, a joint research team lead by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
evaluated the Cluster Approach for efficiency and overall success during the first two 
years of its existence using various methods including stakeholder interviews and 
responses from three hundred thirty-four online surveys.120 “These methods were used to 
seek evidence or specific contributions made by the cluster approach in the following 
areas: identifying and filling gaps in programme areas and coverage; strengthening 
overall capacity to respond and cutting response time; improving partnerships for 
humanitarian action, including with the host state; improving standards; integrating cross-
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cutting issues; improving needs assessment, prioritisation, and strategic planning; and, 
above all, fostering predictable and accountable leadership in the field.”121   
The evaluation was published in November of 2007 and included identification of, “…the 
four main intended outcomes of the Cluster Approach, as defined by [the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee] (IASC): Overall effectiveness at improving humanitarian response, 
creating predictable leadership, enhancing partnership between humanitarian actors, and 
increasing the accountability of relief efforts.”122  In stating these intended outcomes, the 
joint committee created a system through which to evaluate the Cluster Approach in a 
standardized fashion.  Figures 4 through 7 show the four intended outcomes of the 
Cluster Approach on a one to five rating scale based upon eighteen different evaluations 
and case studies written on the topic.  
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Figure 5:  Perception of the Success of the Goal of Overall Effective within the Cluster 
Approach 
123 
Figure 6:  Perception of the Success of the Goal of Predictable Leadership within the 
Cluster Approach 
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Figure 7:  Perception of the Success of the Goal of Partnership within the Cluster 
Approach 
125 
Figure 8:  Perception of the Success of the Goal of Accountability within the Cluster 
Approach 
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The figures present the reality that only overall effectiveness is perceived as relatively 
strong. In addition, the figures assert the truth that the Cluster Approach is not observed 
as fulfilling its goals of predictable leadership, partnership, and accountability.  
According to this meta-analysis of evaluations and case studies, the Cluster Approach is 
not achieving the goals for which it was established. These failures bring into question 
the focus of the system and how to remedy the shortcomings to ensure future success. 
The central focus of the Cluster Approach to date has been cooperative, early response to 
humanitarian crisis, which is a reactionary response to large-scale problems. Considering 
the issues experienced using this focus, it would be more beneficial for the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) to adopt a mitigation and preparedness focus for the Cluster 
Approach moving into the future.  Concentrating on mitigation and preparedness would 
provide a common incentive of decreased workload and expenses for local governments, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations to succeed. This would have 
significant benefits for the three intended outcomes in which the Cluster Approach is 
currently falling behind. In order to identify these benefits, it is useful to analyze in depth 
these intended outcomes.  
 Though the meta-analysis of evaluations and case studies showed that overall 
effectiveness of the Cluster Approach was perceived as relatively strong, this does not 
guarantee that the system is functioning in the highest capacity, nor does it assert that the 
goal is completely accomplished. Evaluating the improvement of overall effectiveness of 
the Cluster Approach involves asking the following questions: “Has the Cluster 																																																																																																																																																																					
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Approach improved overall humanitarian action? And are there positive benefits for 
humanitarian relief and actors?”127  Asking these questions leads one to consider the 
notion of humanitarian relief coordination and if the implementation of the Cluster 
Approach has brought about constructive change. Further, this kind of analysis brings 
into consideration whether policymakers within the United Nations and adjunct groups 
should continue to employ it as a means of mobilizing humanitarian response efforts. 
Effectiveness, in essence, is the amalgamation of all other components of an analysis that 
describes a program or system’s overall success. This being said, problems with 
effectiveness regarding the Cluster Approach are generally very broad and encompass 
many of the issues that are already denoted in the other three areas of the analysis.  
Though generally perceived as satisfactory, a few comprehensive issues impede the 
complete effectiveness of the Cluster Approach. First, the existing coordination 
mechanisms of the Cluster Approach have reached their limits for large-scale, 
multifaceted crises.128  Large-scale disasters or major catastrophes can be defined as 
events that trigger the loss of lives in the hundreds to thousands, and that affect millions 
of people, collapse/damage thousands of buildings and create huge economic losses in 
proportion to the scale of economy of the areas affected.129  The 2010 Haitian earthquake, 
a current example of a large-scale disaster, exposed that “…there was a plethora of 
international, national, and local humanitarian actors, all with varying levels of skills, 
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experience, and capacity, during which the cluster’s coordination mechanism was 
stretched beyond its capacity.”130   Second, though there is optimism about the future of 
the Cluster Approach, local and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have 
raised concerns about the system’s inclusiveness.131   The ability of United Nations 
personnel, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and governments to interact 
seamlessly is vital to the success of the entire mobilization effort. Lastly, 
nongovernmental organizations expressed apprehension over the Cluster Approach 
because they felt it was impeding their humanitarian principles of independence, 
impartiality, and neutrality.132   Many of these organizations believe that they are 
perceived as pursuing political goals through this kind of assistance.133  The 
intermingling of political agendas and personal missions is a major concern of these 
organizations, but the diversity of groups involved in the Cluster Approach allows for 
increased flexibility and ultimately sovereignty of independence for each member.134   
 These concerns about effectiveness can be remedied by making a concentrated 
effort to implement more mitigation policies for areas experiencing crises using the 
Cluster Approach.  Many humanitarian crises that are large-scale could be reduced to a 
manageable size if proper preparedness efforts had been made.  Those problems that 
could be effectively avoided could be through mitigation, thus reducing the collective 
size of the crisis. This would eliminate the issue expressed by many that the Cluster 
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Approach was not suitable for emergency situations that are multi-faceted or extensive in 
size.  In addition, mitigation efforts would foster an inclusive atmosphere for the diverse 
group of agencies involved within the Cluster Approach.  A centralized goal of reducing 
the need for assistance would give agencies an incentive to work together efficiently.  
Lastly, collective focused mitigation attempts would aid in the removal of the notion that 
organizations would be asserting political agendas outside of their personal mission.  
There is no political charge in the prevention of humanitarian crises, only assistance.  
 Predictable leadership is another one of the four major goals of the Cluster 
Approach. Evaluation of the system’s ability to promote predictable leadership indicated 
that most surveyed believed that the Cluster Approach was doing a subpar job.  In 
investigating the ability to promote predictable leadership, one must ask if 
communication between members is effective and if tasks charged to members are being 
completed.135  Using these questions as the basis for analysis, a myriad of issues arise. 
First, there is a high rate of turnover for cluster coordinator.136   This constant change in 
leadership inhibits the cluster’s ability to focus on the tasks allocated to them because 
they are concerned with the modification in leadership style. In addition, cluster leads 
have responsibilities connected to their own particular agency, which gives the 
impression that they are prioritizing that agency’s projects over other projects that match 
need in the specific area experiencing humanitarian crisis.  
 Focusing heavily on mitigation and preparedness instead of quick and early 
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response will ensure that though there are changes in leadership the goal for which any 
leader is aiming is synonymous.  Therefore, when a leadership change is made, the way 
in which a particular cluster is working will not be affected and progress will continue to 
be made. Mitigation efforts offer the mutually beneficial outcome of decreased need for 
assistance because many issues are taken care of before they occur.  This translates into 
reduced workload for involved parties.  A mutually beneficial result ensures that each 
party will take steps to reach that goal instead of merely focusing in personal agendas or 
exclusively beneficial goals.  Shifting the focus of the Cluster Approach to primarily 
mitigation and preparedness policy will eradicate the apprehension that Cluster Leads are 
using their leadership power shovel funds or manpower in the direction of their home 
agency.  These changes will increase the Cluster Approaches ability to promote 
predictable and efficient leadership.  
 The Cluster Approach was implemented to help enhance partnership between 
United Nations agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of all levels, and 
government departments.137  Evaluation of this goal after the system’s implementation 
revealed that few believed this was actually being accomplished. Analysis of this 
intended goal of the Cluster Approach involves investigating the relationships between 
parties within clusters.  Partnerships within clusters are to be in accordance with the 
Principles of Partnership document, which was endorsed by the Global Humanitarian 
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Platform in 2007.138  This document specified that partnerships should be transparent, 
consultative, and have equitably shared power among partners.139 Where the Cluster 
Approach has failed to foster this type of relationship is between United Nations 
Agencies and local and national nongovernmental agencies (NGOs). The consensus 
among nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) is that compromise and communal influence 
over decisions is lacking in the implementation of the Cluster approach. This group in 
particular feels that they have a passive role and seem to merely take orders from the 
cluster lead agency.140   This inequitable distribution of power contradicts the purpose of 
the Cluster Approach. In addition, the way in which cluster meetings are operating is 
extremely exclusive. Many times, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are not made 
aware of these meetings and thus fail to attend based on ignorance.  It is also not 
uncommon for these meetings to be held in a language that is not native to the region in 
question and are held in the capital cities of these places where United Nations offices are 
located.141  This does not enhance partnership within the cluster, which impedes tasks 
from being accomplished and aid from reaching those who need it.  It only encourages 
gaps in assistance and further incompetence within the cluster system. 
 .  Concentrating on mitigation efforts could have substantial benefits for 
partnerships within clusters. Those that completely understand the risks present within a 
particular region are the only individuals that can generate effective preparedness policy.  
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considerable amount of time living in that place. For this reason, mitigation policy is best 
when developed with the assistance of a local individual or group. By heavily focusing 
on mitigation strategies, clusters would depend on the expertise of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that often come from the area in need of assistance.  To understand 
the risks to which that particular region is vulnerable, it would be imperative that 
concerted efforts to extend meeting invitations to nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) be made. In addition, it would require the way in which decisions are made to 
move to a more collective forum of conversation that requires each group’s input. This 
dependency would foster a better working relationship between United Nations agencies, 
government offices, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within all clusters.  
 Accountability is another intended goal of the Cluster Approach.  Evaluation of 
this aspect has found that most did not perceive improvement since the implementation of 
the cluster system.  The Cluster Approach was created to help establish upward, 
downward, and lateral accountability and increased transparency in humanitarian relief 
efforts.142   Ultimately, the goal in establishing accountability and transparency is to 
ensure that things are actually being accomplished and not just talked about.  The notion 
of downward accountability, ground level groups and individuals holding hierarchy to 
their promises, is one that is not currently being enhanced by the implementation of the 
Cluster Approach.  Currently, decisions are made at the top and tasks are allocated 
downward with little regard or understanding of the ground level.  In addition, lateral 
accountability within clusters is lacking, as the partnerships are weak and power not 
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equally distributed.  Lastly, upward accountability holds more weight than it should 
within the cluster system, and it has been used as an explanation for why things do not go 
as intended.  Specifically, cluster lead agencies receive much of the blame for initiatives 
that fail.143  This universal lack of accountability has led many tasks to be left incomplete. 
 The common benefit associated with a system focused on mitigation and 
preparedness would allow the Cluster Approach to foster enhanced accountability in all 
respects.  With the ground level experience being of utmost importance for effective 
mitigation policy, there would be increased engagement at the grassroots level, which 
would bring the target of the humanitarian aid to the forefront.  When the target of aid is 
made more apparent, they gain more power because the hierarchy can no longer 
depersonalize the group in need.  This enhances downward accountability significantly. 
In addition, the collective benefit of less need for response keeps cluster members 
accountable to each other. Each party within the cluster has incentive to succeed thus 
“buying in” to the collective body the Cluster Approach is trying to promote.  If one 
member of the group fails to complete their task, then no one benefits. Parties within the 
cluster will monitor their colleagues in order to ensure the benefit is achieved.  No 
individual member of the Cluster Approach will want to be the one that impeded the 
collective benefit of successful mitigation. For this reason, it would be in all parties’ best 
interest to specify tasks that must be completed, and who is responsible for their 
completion. This will increase overall transparency and will allow failures to be clearly 
identified, which eliminates blame being nonchalantly placed on cluster lead agencies.  
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  Shifting the focus of the Cluster Approach to a system of focused mitigation and 
preparedness efforts would tremendously enhance its effectiveness in humanitarian 
response. The intended goals of overall effectiveness, predictable leadership, enhanced 
partnership, and increased accountability would be achieved by working to prevent major 
humanitarian crises by working to development mitigation strategies. These strategies 
and policies would aid individual countries, nongovernmental organizations, and the 
United Nations circumvent complications that would encumber relief, recovery, and 
reconstruction and, in some instances, could help eliminate humanitarian crises 
altogether. It is in the best interest of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator 
and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to shift the focus of clusters toward 
mitigation to foster a more competent system altogether. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overlap and gaps in assistance within the Cluster Approach are not only major 
inefficiencies within that particular group of organizations. The inefficiencies within the 
cooperative effort of involved agencies leads to prolonged suffering and death within the 
countries in need of humanitarian aid.  With these dire consequences riding on the ability 
of this mobilization system to function effective, it is imperative that steps be taken to 
ensure competent humanitarian response. 
There is no explicitly outlined guide to assist those experiencing humanitarian 
crisis, but there is a specific goal in mind. This goal, to aid countries until the critical 
point at which they can appropriately help themselves, warrants an efficient and effective 
response from those unaffected by the crisis that is in both parties best interest. Amartya 
Sen and John Rawls assert that the most effective way to assist is for liberal, well-ordered 
societies is to aid in the development of mitigation strategies for countries requiring aid. 
Merely providing aid in response to a crisis by simply distributing required resources or 
repairing infrastructure will fix the issue for the moment, but it does not equip a group 
with the means to help themselves.  This kind of humanitarian response does not help a 
society to become self-sufficient, and in fact, it only perpetuates the problem and ensures 
that those societies will be in need of assistance in the future. Offering support during the 
formation and employment of mitigation policy reduces the probability that these 
societies will require future humanitarian aid because they have the ability to handle 
issues themselves. 
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 In addition to being the best alternative in terms of ethics, focusing on mitigation 
and preparedness of humanitarian crises is the best option for ensuring the Cluster 
Approach is a competent system.  Shifting to a system that focuses on preventing 
humanitarian crisis in all regions would help the Cluster Approach to accomplish its 
intended goals of overall effectiveness, predictable leadership, enhanced partnership, and 
increased accountability. Improvements in these areas would ensure that fewer 
individuals would face the consequences of a humanitarian crisis and that those who do 
would receive competent assistance quickly.  Ultimately, concentrating effort within 
clusters on mitigation and preparedness could eliminate a significant amount of suffering 
within the world. 
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